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TEXAS LAW REVIEW

designed to meet the needs of students devoting a year to the study of
international law. The present shorter selection is intended for use in
the many colleges and universities that can devote only one term or
semester to this course. For this purpose the volume is excellently
devised and will undoubtedly meet a wide and enthusiastic acceptance.
It will also be found acceptable for year-courses in which the case method
does not predominate.
It is believed that the editor exercised prevailingly good judgment
in making the amputations and other surgical operations necessary to
reduce a volume of 1440 pages to one of 622 pages. Most topics and
materials of basic importance were left largely untouched. A few topics,
such as National Character of Business Associations, Territory Under
Condominium, and Determination of Territorial Questions by National
Courts were omitted entirely, but chapter headings and general arrangement of material remain unaltered. The number of cases has been reduced from approximately 350 to 140 and an even more drastic reduction was made in the amount of non-case material such as laws, treaties,
and extracts from general texts. Yet the reductions were not made on
a strictly proportional basis. For example, the number of cases from
the courts of the United States was reduced from 155 to 72 while the
corresponding figures for Great Britain are 57 and 19. Inevitably there
will be disagreement regarding certain omissions. Some would hold that
West Rand v. King, omitted in this volume, should be included regardless
of space limitations. The inclusion of extracts from certain easily
accessible treaties and conventions might also be subject to question,
but it must be admitted that it is convenient to both teacher and student
to have them constantly available along with the case material. On one
point there will be universal approval, to-wit, the inclusion in the
shorter selection of virtually all the editor's notes found in the full
edition.
For those desiring a shorter selection the present volume should have
a strong and instant appeal by reason of its retention of the essential
characteristics of the larger volume.
Charles A. Timm.
The University of Texas.
Cases and Materials on the Legal Profession. By Elliott Evans
Cheatham. Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1938. Pp. xviii, 558.
It is the judgment of this reviewer that this case-book indicates
another step forward in the teaching of Legal Ethics. The progress in
this field has been noteworthy and significant. In most schools the
work started with desultory lectures on the subject by members of the
bar. This has proved to be ineffective from the viewpoints both of
methods and substance, because both were superficial. There has been
a growing conviction that if the thing was worth doing it was worth
doing well, and also that it was worth doing. A three-year curriculum
of necessity does not cover many important fields. The problem of
inclusion and exclusion is a constant one and is resolved by a compromise
which from time to time places varying emphasis upon different subjectmatters and teaching technics. The standard curriculum has been made
by teachers without much respect for outside opinion. Pressure from
the outside has, however, induced the inclusion of a course in Legal
Ethics in the curriculum of a number of schools.
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Many have thought that the public aspect of a lawyer's work has
been slighted and that the law schools should rearrange themselves
so that they could effectively meet that criticism. Most of those same
people have insisted that it did little good, however, to emphasize the
so-called professional character of a lawyer's career if that character
be stated solely in terms of dogmatism and tradition. One's concept of
a desirable professional standard can be as narrow and as prejudiced
as his concepts in any field. Even although it be rather broad he may
pay only lip-service homage to it. The public in general and social
scientists in particular so far as I can see have felt quite keenly that
the professional standards of lawyers were quite formal, were too
narrow, and on the whole ineffectively put into action. A great many
of those people insist that lawyers on the other hand "speak well of
themselves" and that they have been inclined to insist that salvation
comes through faith and that salvation is individual, not social; that
lawyers enjoy a belief in the nature of society and law and its administration which denies expressly or by implication a good many of the
observable social complexities. They insist that under the lawyer's
guidance legal ethics has been largely an individual and not a social
problem. They conclude that a doctrine of human imperfection makes
the picture complete with the result that lawyers are free from blame
and the nature of human nature becomes the scapegoat. I am afraid
that a great many lawyers will dissent from that criticism but when
so many disinterested outside people join in it we might well be forced
to conclude that it is not without some merit.
We would do well to recognize the fact that the doctrine which makes
a lawyer an advocate owing complete loyalty to his client's interests
(which are, of course, selfish) and the doctrine which makes a lawyer
an officer of the court where he owes a duty to see that justice is administered fairly (where emphasis shifts from individual interests to
social interests) are inevitably in conflict. How that conflict is to be
resolved is the field of legal ethics, and the problem is anything but
formal or easy. This case-book very admirably forms the basis for an
adequate presentation of that problem. Among other things it contains
considerable material giving expression to lay and lawyer discontent
with the existing system. It is not to be inferred that it overemphasizes that subject, because it does not. It does give, however,
materials for a realistic and critical presentation of the subject and
tends to minimize the purely formal and polite aspects of legal ethics.
The organization of the materials presents a new analysis of the
subject which appeals to me as being helpful. For example, all of the
sanctions designed to secure recognition of the accepted standards are
dealt with in one section early in the book; the Lawyer As Advocate
is dealt with in one chapter.
A chapter on The Lawyer and Legislative Bodies and a final one on
Developments in the Profession and Its Work are innovations and are
significant.
So far as the materials used are concerned there is no slighting
of case materials, but there is emphasis on other types. One of the
most important additions is the inclusion of a number of opinions by
Bar Association Committees interpreting the accepted canons. These
cover a great many points upon which there is no litigation, all to
good advantage.
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This review is purposely general in tone. Specific criticism ought to
await intensive use of the book. This reviewer has tried to make it
clear that he is enthusiastic over the book. It seems to him to be a
very significant contribution to the literature on the subject. It is
neither orthodox nor radical, but it might well form the basis of a
healthy skepticism on the subject. The legal profession is not above
reproach and an honest inquiry into its habits and standards ought
to result in some good.
Bernard C. Gavit.
The University of Indiana.

